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Abstract
A model is developed that allows for interaction between the labor market and the housing
market. A job location has an associated commuting time that may affect the job acceptance
decision. Obstacles to mobility, such as regulations in the housing market will affect the reser-
vation strategy of workers. Thus, aggregate unemployment will depend, at least partly, on the
functioning of the housing market. Data from the U.S. and E.U. reveals that individuals in the
U.S. are about three times more likely to experience a change in residence within a given year.
At the same time, unemployment in the E.U. is roughly twice that in the U.S. This paper seeks
to understand, both qualitatively and quantitatively, how housing market frictions might affect
the functioning of the labor market.
1 Introduction
A model is developed that allows for interaction between the labor market and the housing market.
A job location has an associated commuting time that may affect the job acceptance decision.
Obstacles to mobility, such as regulations in the housing market will affect the reservation strategy
of workers. Thus, aggregate unemployment will depend, at least partly, on the functioning of the
housing market.
Data for the U.S. shows that on average between 1990 and 2000 about 16% of residents move
yearly.1 In comparison, data for fifteen European Union countries show that less than 5% of
residents move yearly. In addition, data on reasons for moving allows us to distinguish between
job-related and family (or housing-related) moves, and this distinction is built into the model.2
Although residents in the U.S. move about three times the rate of those in the E.U., the reasons
why they move are roughly similar. This observation suggests that the shocks that affect mobility
are similar across the countries yet there is substantially less overall mobility in the E.U.
In terms of labor markets, in July of 2007 the unemployment rate in the United States was
4.6 %. In contrast, in the four large continental countries – France, Germany, Spain, and Italy
– the unemployment rate was substantially higher. The Spanish unemployment rate was over
8%, Italy around 7%, Germany over 8% and France above 9%. Moreover, as noted by Blan-
chard (http://www.nber.org/reporter/summer04/blanchard.html) “...at a given unemployment rate,
individual unemployment duration is substantially longer, and flows in and out of unemployment
substantially lower, in Europe than in the United States.”
This paper develops a model that links the labor market and the housing market and shows that
the functioning of the housing market can affect unemployment and job vacancies. The theory
predicts that greater frictions in the housing market makes individuals more choosy about the jobs
they take.
We also extend the model to address short (intra-county) vs. long (inter-county) moves. This
1Geographical Mobility, Current Population Reports, P20-538, May, 2001, U.S. Department of the Census.
2Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey, Current Population Reports, P23-204,
May, 2001, U.S. Department of the Census.
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is of interest because the reasons for moving short distances as compared to long distances are
different.
2 Mobility Data
Mobility data for the U.S. and E.U. comes from two sources: the U.S. Census 2000 data and the
European Community Household Panel (1999-2001) which contain similar questions.
Table 1: Mobility in the U.S. and E.U.
US EU15
Mobility rate 15.5% 4.95%
Share within county / area 0.67 0.83
Share between county / area 0.33 0.17
Table 1 reveals that 15.5% of American residents move yearly for one reason or another. About
2/3 of these moves are within county. In contrast, mobility in the EU15 is about 1/3 of that in the
U.S. The share of moves within an area/locality is higher, although at this level of disaggregation it
is difficult to strictly compare to US counties. Table 2 provides an overview of reasons for moving
for those that moved. In the U.S., most of the intra-county mobility is house related (65.4%),
and only a small fraction (5.6%) move within a county for job related reasons. In contrast, work
related mobility is approximately 33% of inter-county moves. Family related mobility is a fairly
constant fraction of all moves. In the E.U., perhaps surprisingly, there is a very similar pattern. The
Census questions are actually more precise about the exact reasons for mobility, while no detailed
questions are avaialble in the ECHP. Table 3 gives the details for the U.S.
Finally, Table 4 shows that the reasons for work-related mobility are quite different within and
across counties. As expected, intra-county work-related moves bring workers closer to their job,
while 70% of inter-county work-related moves are related to a new job.
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Table 2: Reasons for Moving, US and EU15
Proportions, US Proportions, EU15
All pop. (1+) intra-county inter-county all intra-area inter-area all
Work related 5.6% 31.1% 16.2% Job related 7.61% 40.0% 14.3%
Family related 25.9% 26.9% 26.3% Personal Reason 31.6% 29.8% 31.3%
House related 65.4% 31.9% 51.6% House Related 59.1% 28.1% 52.7%
Others 3.0% 10.1% 6.0% Not Available 1.7% 2.11% 1.8%
All reasons 100% 100% All reasons 100% 100% 100%
Table 3: Reasons for Moving, U.S.
Work House
new job or job transfer 60.5% wanted own home, not rent 22.2%
look for work or lost job 9.7% wanted new or better home/appartment 35.8%
closer to work / easier commute 19.6% wanted better neighborhood/less crime 8.6%
retire 2.4% wanted cheaper housing 10.8%
other job related reason 7.7% other housing reason 22.6%
All work related reasons 100% All house related reasons 100%
Family Other
change in marital status 23% attend or leave college 38.2%
establish own household 27.2% change of climate 11.0%
other family reason 49.8% health reason 17.2%
All family related reasons 100% other reasons 33.6%
All other related reasons 100%
Table 4: Work-related Moves, U.S.
Work related All Intra Inter
new job or job transfer 60.5% 24.5% 69.4%
look for work or lost job 9.7% 9.4% 7.7%
closer to work / easier commute 19.6% 53.5% 13.6%
retire 2.4% 1.4% 3.0%
other job related reason 7.7% 11.1% 6.3%
total 100% 100% 100%
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3 Model
3.1 Preferences and Search in the Housing Sector
A dwelling is a bundle of services generating utility to individuals or a household. The defining
characteristic of a dwelling, however, is that the services it providess are attached to a fixed loca-
tion. The services can, of course, depend on the quality of the dwelling and its particular location.
Amenities such as space, comfort, proximity to theaters, recreation, shops and the proximity to
one’s job increase the utility of a given dwelling. The dwelling may also be a factor of production
of home-produced goods. In addition, the dwelling could be a capital asset. For these services,
individuals pay a rent or a mortgage. We assume that the rent or mortgage is such that utility across
dwellings will be equalized to reflect any differences in amenities.
In this paper we focus on one particular amenity, distance to work. Because a dwelling is fixed
to a location, the commuting distance to one’s job, ρ , becomes an important determinant of both
job and housing choice. We assume that space is symmetric, in the sense that the unemployed have
the same chance of finding a job wherever their current residence, implying that ρ is a sufficient
statistic determining both housing and job choice.
Time is continuous and individuals discount the future at rate r. Agents face two types of
housing shocks. First, they may receive a family shock that arrives according to a Poisson process
with parameter δ . The shock changes the valuation of the current location, necessitating a move.
This shock can be thought of as a marriage, divorce, the arrival of children, deterioration of the
neighborhood, and so on. Upon the arrival of the shock they make one draw from the existing
stock of housing vacancies, distributed as GS(ρ).3 Note that agents may sample from the existing
stock of houses at any time.
Second, agents randomly receive new housing opportunities that (possibly) allows them to
relocate closer to their job. These arrivals are assumed to be Poisson with parameter λH . The
distribution of new vacancies is given as GN(ρ).
3The one draw assumption is not very strong. It is equivalent to making up to N independent draws, in which case
this would be like one single draw from a distribution (GS)N . See Lemma 1 in Quentin et al. (2006).
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In the model, λH is the parameter determining frictions in the housing market. An increase
in λH means there are more arrivals of opportunities to find housing. As λH approaches infinity,
housing frictions go to zero. Obviously, if λH = 0 there is no mobility. The main idea behind λH is
that agents may not move instantaneously to their preferred location. Such restrictions might arise
from length of lease requirements or eviction policies.
3.2 Labor market
Individuals can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed. While employed, income
consists of an exogenous wage, I = w. We assume no on-the-job search and all separations from
the job occur exogenously with Poisson arrival rate, s.
The unemployed receive income I = b, where b can be thought of as the utility from not
working. While unemployed, job offers arrive at Poisson rate p, indexed by a distance to work, ρ ,
drawn from the cumulative distribution function FJ .
Let E(ρ) be the value of employment for an individual residing at distance ρ from the job.
Let U be the value of unemployment, which does not depend on distance given the symmetry
assumption made above. We can now express the problem in terms of the following Bellman
equations;
(r+ s)E(ρ) = w− τρ+ sU+λH
∫
max
[
0,(E(ρ ′)−E(ρ))]dGN(ρ ′) (1)
+δ
∫
max[U−E(ρ),E(ρ ′′)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ ′′)
(r+ p)U = b+ p
∫ ∫
max[U,E(ρ ′),E(ρ
′′
)]dFJ(ρ ′)dGS(ρ ′′), (2)
where τ is the per unit cost of commuting and ρ is the distance of the commute. Eq. 1 states that
workers receive a utility flow w− τρ; may lose their job and become unemployed – in which case
they stay where they are; they receive a housing offer among the new vacancies GN , which happens
with intensity λH , in which case they have the option of moving closer to their job; and finally may
receive a family shock δ , and need to relocate.
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Eq. 2 states that the unemployed enjoy b; receive a job offer with Poisson intensity p at a
distance ρ ′ from the distribution FJ(ρ). They have the option of rejecting the offer if the distance
is too far, but also have the option to move instantaneously if they find a residence in the stock
of existing vacant units. To the extent that ρ ′ and ρ ′′ are independent draws, this means that
there is a distribution, F , combining FJ and GS such that the integral terms can be rewritten as∫
max[U,E(ρ)]dF(ρ) where ρ will simply be the min of the two draws: ρ =Min(ρ ′,ρ ′′).4
3.3 Reservation strategies
We now derive the job acceptance and moving strategies of individuals. Observe that E is down-
ward sloping in ρ , with slope
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHPW +δPδ
, (3)
where PW is the probability of moving conditional on receiving a housing offer and Pδ is the
probability of moving conditional on receiving a family shock. Note that 0 < PW < 1 and 0 < Pδ <
1 and possibly depends on ρ . The function E(ρ) is monotonic so that there exists a well-defined
reservation strategy for the employed, with a reservation distance denoted by ρE(ρ), below which
a housing offer is accepted. In addition, there is a reservation strategy ρδ (ρ), below which an
agent relocates when hit by a family shock. Note that there is state-dependence in the reservation
strategy of the employed, ρE(ρ), with presumably dρE/dρ > 0. The further away the tenants live
from their job, the less likely they will be to reject a housing offer, therefore,
PW = GN(ρE(ρ)).
Similarly, for a family shock, we have
Pδ = GS(ρE(ρ)).
We can now rewrite Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 as:
4We prove in the appendix that 1−F(ρ) = (1−FJ(ρ))(1−GS(ρ)).
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(r+ s)E(ρ) = w− τρ+ sU+λH
∫ ρ
0
[E(ρ ′)−E(ρ)]dGN(ρ ′) (4)
+δ
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ ′′)+δ
∫ +∞
ρu
[U−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ ′′)
(r+ p)U = b+ p
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′)]dF(ρ ′)+ pU(1−F(ρu)) (5)
Note that in addition to the exogenous separation from the match, s, there is an additional
source of entry into unemployment. It arises due to workers receiving a family shock, redrawing
in the vacant housing stock distribution, but are unable to find a sufficiently close dwelling to the
current job and (optimally) quit. That is, s′ = s+δ (1−GS(ρu). The slope of E(ρ) is now written
as
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρU)
. (6)
Next, in the absence of relocation costs (this case is studied in the Appendix), tenants move as
soon as they get a dwelling offer closer to their current one, implying
ρE(ρ) = ρ.
Denote by ρU the reservation strategy for the unemployed, below which any job offer is accepted,
it is defined by
E(ρU) =U.
Using the fact that E(ρU) =U ,
b+ p
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′)−U ]dF(ρ ′)
= w− τρU +λH
∫ ρU
0
[E(ρ ′)−U ]dGN(ρ ′)+δ
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′′)−U ]dGS(ρ ′′). (7)
Integrating Eq. 7 by parts gives:
ρU =
w−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)− pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρU)
dρ. (8)
8
The determination of ρU is shown in Figure 1.
With this specification the model is quite parsimonious, since a single variable, ρ , determines
several dimensions of choice:
1. job acceptance: F(ρU) ;
2. residential mobility rate:
∫
λHGN(ρ) over the distribution of commute distance of employed
workers dΦ;
3. quit rate due to family shock: δ (1−GS(ρU)).
Figure 1: Determination of ρu
U
E ( ρ )
Asset values 
E, U
F(ρ)
F(ρU): equilibrium 
acceptance rate
Figure 2 provides an overview of the transitions and the acceptance decisions of the unem-
ployed: jobs closer than distance ρU are accepted and jobs farther are rejected by workers.
3.4 Free entry
Assuming free entry of firms, and defining θ as the tightness of the labor market, θ = VU , we have
y−w
r+ s′
=
c
q(θ)PF
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Figure 2: Transitions and Acceptance Decision
ρU
Offers are 
rejected
Offer are 
accepted
Possible trajectory: U -----> E -----> E’ -----> U
p                λH s
Density of job offers F
where PF is the rate of acceptance of job offers by the unemployed, as expected from the viewpoint
of the firm. We assume, still by symmetry, that the distribution of contacts between the firm and
unemployed workers has distribution F(ρ), so that PF = F(ρU). This generates a positive link
between θ and ρU since q′(θ)< 0, characterized by:
q(θ)F(ρU) =
c(r+ s′)
y−w . (9)
The intuition is quite simple. The firm’s iso-profit curve at the entry stage depends negatively
on both θ (as a higher θ implies more competition between the firm and the worker) and on ρU (as
more of their offers will be rejected because of distance). The zero-profit condition thus implies
a positive link between θ and ρU . Note that this relation is independent of λH . On the other
hand, ρU is determined through (Eq. 8). It is decreasing in p(θ) and thus in θ , as can be seen
in (Eq. 11). When there are more job offers (higher θ ) workers can wait for offers closer to their
current residential location; they are pickier. The two curves are represented in (ρU ,θ ) space in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Vacancies and Reservation Strategy
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3.5 Unemployment and the Beveridge curve
To sum up, the unemployment effect of an increase in λH is twofold: it raises the acceptance
rate of job offers and raises θ , thus increasing job offers by firm. In terms of a Beveridge curve
representation, this is like an inward shift of the curve (less structural mismatch) and a counter-
clockwise rotation of θ .
Letting p= p(θ) = θq(θ), the unemployment rate is given as
u=
s′
s′+ p(θ)F(ρU)
. (10)
A graphical representation of this result in the Beveridge space is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Beveridge Curve
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4 Housing frictions and mobility
To determine how housing frictions affect the decisions of workers and firms, it is necessary to
determine how the reservation distance is affected. Fully differentiating ρu gives
dρU
(
r+ s+ pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρU)
)
=
(∫ ρU
0
GN(ρ)(r+ s)+ pF(ρ)GN(ρ)
[r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρU)]2
dρ
)
dλH (11)
−
(∫ ρU
0
F(ρ)dρ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρU)
)
dp+d
(
w−b
τ
)
Equation (11) indicates that ρU depends positively on λH , negatively on p and positively on w−b.
An increase in λH (more housing offers) will shift the curve in Figure 1 upward, raising ρU and
thus the acceptance rate of the unemployed. The intuition is simply that they take the job offer
hoping to find a better location in the near future because housing offers arrive very frequently.
Hence,
Proposition 1 An increase in λH makes the unemployed less choosy about jobs: ∂ρU/∂λH > 0.
Next, differentiating (9) and using Proposition 1, we obtain:
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Proposition 2 More housing frictions reduce job creation: ∂θ/∂λH > 0.
This is an indirect effect caused by more job creation through the higher job acceptance rate
of workers. Another interpretation of this effect is that firms are reluctant to create jobs where
workers have no place to live.
Proposition 3 : An increase in λH has three effects on unemployment:
• it reduces the quit rate from a δ -shock,
• it raises the job acceptance rate of workers (through a higher thresehold ρU ),
• it raises θ (Proposition 2) and thus job creation.
The proof is found by first differentiating u:
du
dλH
=
−δgS(ρU)ωρ(s′+ p(θ)F(ρU))− s′[−δgS(ρU)ωρ + p(θ) f (ρU)ωρ + p′(θ)F(ρU)ωθ ]
[s′+ p(θ)F(ρU)]2
=
−δgS(ρU)p(θ)F(ρU)ωρ − s′
[
p(θ) f (ρU)ωρ + p′(θ)F(ρU)ωθ
]
[s′+ p(θ)F(ρU)]2
.
Next,
ds′
dλH
=−δgS(ρU)∂ρ
U
∂λH
=−δgS(ρU)ωρ < 0,
whereωρ is simply a convenient notation for the partial derivative of ρu with respect to λH . Finally,
note that
d[p(θ)F(ρU)]
dλH
= p′(θ)F(ρU)
∂θ
∂λh
+ p(θ) f (ρU)
∂ρU
∂λH
= p(θ) f (ρU)ωρ + p′(θ)F(ρU)ωθ > 0
where ωθ is another convenient notation for the partial derivative of θ with respect to λH .
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4.1 Mobility rate
We can now investigate the mobility rate. Let Φ(ρ) be the steady-state distribution of employed
workers living at a distance closer than ρ . Φ is governed by the following law of motion:
(1−u)∂Φ(ρ)
∂ t
= upF(ρ)+(1−u)λHGN(ρ) [1−Φ(ρ)]+(1−u)δGS(ρ) [1−Φ(ρ)]−(1−u)Φ(ρ)s.
(12)
Eq. 12 states that the number of people residing in a location closer to a given ρ from their job
changes (either positively or negatively) due to:
• (+) to the unemployed u receiving a job offer at rate p with a distance closer to ρ with
probability F(ρ)
• (+) due to the employed 1−u who are further away from the current distance ρ (a fraction
1−Φ(ρ)) and receive an offer on the housing market with intensity λW closer to ρ with
probability GN(ρ);
• (+) due to the employed 1−u who are further away from the current distance ρ (a fraction
1−Φ(ρ)) and need to relocate in the instant due to a demographic shock δ and happen to
sample a new distance smaller than ρ with probability GS(ρ);
• (-) there are s exits per unit of time due to people losing their job.
In steady state and for all ρ < ρu
Φ(ρ) =
pF(ρ) u1−u +λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)
s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)
(13)
=
F(ρ)
F(ρu)s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)
s+λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)
≤ 1 (14)
with equality in ρ = ρU : Φ(ρU) = 1 as no unemployed ever accept a job offer further away from
a job than ρU and then, no employed worker subsequently moves away from his/her job, only
closer from the current job. The second line above is obtained in replacing u by its steady-state
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expression in (10). We see that, as expected, all workers have a house at a distance below ρU since
they won’t move for a house at a longer distance than that of the job they eventually accepted.
Now, two special cases:
• if firms receive no offer (λHGN = δGS(ρ) = 0), the distribution of distance of the employed
Φ converges to F(ρ)F(ρu) , that is, the distribution of ρ conditional on a job being accepted
• if jobs are not destroyed, s= 0, the distribution of distance of the employed Φ converges to
0, that is, Φ(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0: all workers eventually find a house infinitely close to their
job.
We can now write the various mobility rates of the different sub-samples of the population.
Denote by MSK the number of movers of status S=(U,E) (unemployed, employed) and for a reason
K=(J,D) (job-related or divorce-related), we have:
1. job-related mobility of the employed: they have a job and relocate once they sample a better
housing location:
MEJ = (1−u)λH
∫ ρU
0
GN(ρ)dΦ(ρ) (15)
= (1−u)λH
[
GN(ρU)−
∫ ρU
0
gN(ρ)Φ(ρ)dρ
]
(16)
where the second line is found from integrating by parts and noticing that Φ(ρU) = 1.
2. job-related mobility of the unemployed: they have a job, accept it with probability G(ρU)
and may relocate if they drew a location from GS closer from their current ρ:
MUJ = up
∫ ρU
0
GS(ρ)dFJ(ρ)
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3. demography-related mobility:
MUD = uδ
MED = (1−u)δ
ME+UD = δ
Note that in MED , a part of workers have to quit their job (a fraction 1−GS(ρU) to be precise).
4.2 Special Case: λH → ∞.
In this case, the model collapses to Φ(ρ) = 1, meaning that all workers will be located infinitly
close to their job. The job acceptance decision is indeterminate since we now have
ρU =
w−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
dρ
The economics is simple though: if w > b, all job offers are accepted, meaning that ρU goes to
infinity. Therefore, we obtain the standard Pissarides value for tightness: q(θ ∗) = c(r+s
′)
y−w with
θ ∗ > 1. In addition,
q(θ ∗)
q(1)
= F(ρU)< 1
and therefore, with q(θ +dθ) = q(θ)+q′(θ)dθ = q(θ)(1+ηqdθ/θ), we have
q(θ ∗)
q(1)
= 1+ηqdθ/θ = F(ρU)
hence
dθ
θ
= θ ∗−1 = 1−F(ρ
U)
−ηq > 0
We can decompose unemployment into two parts:
u=
s
s+ p
implying
du
u
=− dp
s+ p
=−(1−u)dp
p
=−(1−u)dθ
θ
ηp
16
Thus
du
u
=−(1−u)1−F(ρ
U)
−ηq ηp
With ηq =−0.5 and ηp = 0.5, we have that the variation in unemployment purely due to imperfect
housing markets is of the order of magnitude of the fraction of rejected offers 1−F(ρU).
5 Calibration
The time period is one month. We set the interest rate, r, to 0.0033, correspondinng to an annual
rate of 0.04. We calibrate to the mobility rate of the employed, which was 17% between March
1999 and March 2000, so the target is (17/12)%. The number for the employed that move comes
from the Bureau of the Census.5 Of the roughly 31 million persons who moved during that year,
22.3 million of them were employed, 1.5 million unemployed and 7.8 million out of the labor
force.
We set δ = 0 (no demographic shock) and the stock of vacant housing GS = 0. Therefore, we
are left with two distributions: GN , new housing offers and F , job offers. We assume that they are
represented by the same exponential function with parameter α: F = GN = 1− e−αρ .
The program finds the parameters of the model such that:
• We match the unemployment rate in the U.S., which averaged about 4.2% between March
1999 and March 2000, and the job hiring rate, p = 1/2.4 monthly, meaning an average
duration of unemployment of 2.4 months; this imposes a value for s given that u= s/(s+ p)
when δ = 0: s= p(u/(1−u)) = 0.0183.
• We set p(θ) = Aθ 0.5. If we fix
θ = 1, (17)
we obtain A = 0.5. Together with the free-entry condition, (Eq. 9), this fixes a value for
recruiting costs c: we will set y= 1, w= 0.8, q(θ) = Aθ−0.5.
5Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey, P23-204, Bureau of the Census, May,
2001.
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• We match the mobility rate to a target value of 17% annually (17/12% monthly) with (Eq. 16).
The program finds the values of α and λH which lead to the right value of mobility given ρU
obtained from (Eq. 8).
To find a value for α we use data on the distribution of commute times from the Census 2000.
Figure 5 shows that the distribution is close to an exponential. The mean commute time is about 24
minutes. Let ρ be the distance expressed in monthly commuting time. We then have F(φρ), where
φ is a scale parameter reflecting the change in units since the data is for one-way commuting time.
Assuming that people commute twice a day and 20 days a month, φ = 1/40. When estimating the
slope of log(1-F(φρ)) which, under the assumption of an exponential distribution with coefficient
α , is αφ , we obtain 0.0548 (or 0.065 if we drop commute times of zero) as the estimate. It follows
that we should fix a value of α = 0.0548∗40= 2.19 (or 2.6=0.065*40 under the second estimate).
Figure 5: Distribution of Commute Times
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Next, we repeat the above exercise using European values. In particular, we set the mobility
target to one third of its US value, set the unemployment duration to one third of the US value, set
unemployment benefits to 0.55 instead of 0.25, finally set the unemployment target to 10%.
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5.1 Findings
The findings for the benchmark economy are given in Table 5 where each column represents a
different arrival rate of housing offers. The value of the scale parameter of the matching function,
A, is 0.4657, and the recruiting cost, c, is 3.858. These values do not change as λh changes.
Table 5: U.S. Calibration
λh= 0.0533 2∗λ h 3∗λ h 10∗λ h
θ 1.0000 1.1522 1.2148 1.2493
ρU 1.0278 1.4738 1.9521 5.6238
FU 0.8947 0.9603 0.9861 1.0000
rej. rate 0.1053 0.0397 0.0139 4.5E-6
unemployment 0.042 0.0367 0.0348 0.0339
mobility 0.0136 0.0215 0.0269 0.0445
Reducing frictions in the housing market by increasing the value of λh results in only a modest
gain to improving mobility (that is, multiplying the speed of arrival of housing offers by 2, 3, or
10). The model converges rapidily to the ”frictionless” (no housing frictions) rate of unemployment
which is 0.034 instead of 0.042. In short, housing frictions increase unemployment by a little more
than half a percentage point.
We now calibrate the model to a “typical” European situation where mobility is a third of that
of the US, and unemployment duration is also three times higher than in the US. The findings
are shown in Table 6. We obtain a lower value of λh, 0.0153, so that there are nearly twice the
housing offers in the U.S. as compared to Europe, λUSh /λ
EU
h = 3.48. We find A = 0.1836 that is,
the scale parameter of the matching function is about one third lower in Europe. The program also
finds lower vacancy costs in Europe (c= 1.4803) which implies that total setup costs of firms are
similar to that of the US: Hiring costs are equal to c/q= 3.8579/0.4657 = 8.28 in the US, and are
equal to 1.4803/0.1836 = 8.06 in Europe.
In the European case, since the housing market was calibrated with a lower mobility rate,
λh is smaller. Hence, workers reject more job offers since they find it more difficult to move
subsequently. The rejection rate is 0.21. Further, reducing frictions in the housing market, that is,
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Table 6: European Calibration
λh= 0.0153 2∗λ h 3∗λ h 10∗λ h
θ 1.000 1.1436 1.2647 1.6684
ρU 0.6446 0.7554 0.8678 1.7196
FU 0.7563 0.8088 0.8505 0.9769
rej. rate 0.2437 0.1912 0.1495 0.0231
unemployment 0.1000 0.0886 0.0808 0.0624
mobility 0.0042 0.0078 0.0108 0.0234
Europe Benchmark λUSh A
US AUS , cUS bUS
θ 1.000 1.3153 2.4385 0.6122 1.4177
ρU 0.6446 0.9224 0.2862 0.4278 1.0535
FU 0.7563 0.8673 0.4657 0.6082 0.9005
rej. rate 0.2437 0.1327 0.5343 0.3918 0.0995
unemployment 0.1000 0.0779 0.0436 0.0651 0.0727
mobility 0.0042 0.0121 0.0030 0.0037 0.0051
raising λh, now delivers a quite significant improvement in the labor market as unemployment is
reduced by approximately 2 percentage points.
5.1.1 More counterfactuals for Europe
A last exercise we can run is to start from European values and change the various parameters to
US levels: in order, λh, A, A and c together and b.
We can see that the Europe calibrated economy could gain almost as much in raising the effi-
ciency of the housing market to US levels as in cutting unemployment benefits to the (very low)
US levels. The most efficient margin of action is however to raise the effectiveness of matching in
the labor market in Europe.
We now allow for a demographic shock.
For the U.S, we find c= 4.6303 and A= 0.4182.
The calibration for Europe finds c= 1.6440 and A= 0.1389.
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Table 7: U.S. Calibration, δ > 0
λ h = 0.0048 2∗λ h 3∗λ h 10∗λ h
θ 1.0000 1.0039 1.0057 1.0073
ρU 0.4109 0.4669 0.5244 0.9403
FU 0.9964 0.9983 0.9992 1.0000
rej. rate 0.0036 0.0017 7.6E-4 2.6E-6
unemployment 0.0420 0.0407 0.0397 0.0356
mobility 0.0018 0.0035 0.0049 0.0123
Table 8: Europe, δ > 0
λ h = 0.0143 2∗λ h 3∗λ h 10∗λ h
θ 1.0000 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003
ρU 0.6506 0.8806 1.1113 2.7180
FU 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
rej. rate 1.3E-4 5.8E-6 2.5E-7 1.1E-16
unemployment 0.1000 0.0949 0.0921 0.0890
mobility 0.0047 0.0081 0.0107 0.0212
5.1.2 Additional Experiments
The model also displays complementarities. The relationship between λH and u varies depending
on the value of the utility from not working, b. Alternatively it is possible to vary b and look at the
link between the rejection rate, (1−FU ), and unemployment, u. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the
findings of these experiments.
6 What is λH?
6.1 A model
Landlords post vacancies and screen applicants. They offer a lease to the “best applicants”, in a
sense defined below. In case of a default on the rent by the tenant, however, landlords incur a loss
due to the length of litigation and eviction procedures. The asset value of owning a dwelling with
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Figure 6: Unemployment and Housing Market Frictions
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Figure 7: Unemployment and the Rejection Rate
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a tenant defaulting on the rent is denoted by Λ. Therefore, Λ will decline with more regulation in
the rental housing market, due to the length of the procedures to recover the unpaid rents and the
dwelling.
Potential tenants (applicants) are all ex-ante homogenous but ex-post may represent a default
risk for the landlord. More precisely, at the time of the contact between the applicant, the landlord
gets a random signal on the tenant and postulates that the particular applicant has a specific default
rate δi (a Poisson rate in continuous time). It follows that for such a tenant, the value of a filled
vacancy for the landlord is:
rHF = R+δi(Λ−HF)
where R is the rent and HF is the value of a filled vacancy.6 We therefore have:
HF =
R+δiΛ
r+δi
(18)
The derivative of HF with respect to δi is given as Λr−R, which is negative since the landlord’s
value of a default, Λ, cannot be higher than the capitalized value of the rent R/δi. Therefore, HF is
decreasing in δi, from R/r to Λ. This implies that there will be a well defined reservation strategy
by landlords given the signal they receive.
To derive this reservation strategy, we denote by HV the value of a vacant housing unit prior
to screening. This value is exogenous and is given, in the long-run, by the cost of construction of
new housing units. Therefore, it is independent of rental regulations and in particular of Λ. At the
time of a contact with a tenant, landlords decide to offer a lease if the perceived value of default δi
is below a cut-off value δ with
R+δΛ
r+δ
= HV
or δ =
R− rΛ
HV −Λ
6Recall that we assumed in the model that the flow of service of the dwelling to the tenant was exactly compensating
the rent so we did not need to include the rent in the Bellman equations of workers. We also assume that workers do
not benefit from defaulting on the rent: in case of default, they may have a disutulity exerted by landlords or their
lawyers so that, after default, the value of being in a dwelling is not higher than it was when paying. Therefore, the
expression for the Belmann equations of tenants derived previously is unchanged .
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Note that δ is increasing in Λ: the higher is Λ, the easier it is to accept a tenant since the risk of
default is lower.
Hence, the screening rate, α , of tenants is prob (δi > δ ). Denoting by L(δi) the c.d.f. of
default-rates, we have
α = 1−L
(
R− rΛ
HV −Λ
)
The screening rate is therefore increasing when Λ is lower, that is, when rental housing market
regulations are higher.
Finally, denote by φ the Poisson rate at which tenants receive dwelling offers. We assume that
this contact rate is exogenous. It then follows that
λH = φα
Therefore:
Proposition 4: λH is decreasing in the amount of housing market regulations.
We will now investigate in the data whether there is indeed a link between mobility, unemploy-
ment and housing market regulations.
6.2 Within-EU mobility differences in rental housing market regulations.
Europe has so far been considered as a homogenous block. However, there are fairly large ge-
ographical mobility differences between countries. Scandinavian countries report mobility rates
which are close to the US rates, while Southern European countries exhibit the lowest of all rates.
Part of the differences may be due to socio-cultural factors, such as family attachment and to differ-
ences in regions leading to higher mobility costs. However, our model provides a natural starting
point for an analysis of mobility.
We first report indices of rental housing market regulations collected by Djankov et al. (2002).
This is a composite index based on the difficulty to evict a tenant, reflecting the complexity and the
length of the procedure at various stages (pre-trial, process of trial, execution of the court decision).
We report the numbers for 13 European countries and contrast the indices with mobility rates and
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with average unemployment rates.
Mobility rate
outside the area
within 3 yrs.
Housing
market regulation
index
Average
unemployment
rate 1995-2001
Denmark 0.054 3.6 5.3
Netherlands 0.029 3 4.2
Belgium 0.013 3.17 8.5
France 0.042 3.6 10.4
Ireland 0.010 3.2 7.9
Italy 0.011 4.24 10.7
Greece 0.011 4.31 10.5
Spain 0.009 4.81 14.5
Portugal 0.007 4.54 5.6
Austria 0.015 3.62 4.02
Finland 0.058 2.53 11.9
Germany 0.021 3.76 8.3
UK 0.072 2.22 6.5
Source of data: mobility figures based on ECHP. Regulation indices based on Djankov et al. (2002).
Unempoyment based on Eurostat statistics.
Figure 8 diplays a strong, negative correlation between housing market regulations and mobility
rate across European countries. This is a good illustration of Proposition 4: higher regulation lower
λH which in turn reduces mobility.
The strong and negative correlation suggests that indeed, our model has the potential to explain
mobility patterns using the parameter λH .
The next question is whether regulations can explain, per se, a large share of unemployment
differences? The answer lies in Figure 9 the next chart and appears to be yes to some extent, at
least based on this scatter plot. The correlation coefficient between the series is 0.31 and the R-sq
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Figure 8: Housing Regulations and Mobility
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is 0.09.
7 Concluding comments
In this paper we have taken seriously the idea that labor market frictions, and in particular the
reservation strategies of unemployed workers when they decide whether or not to accept a job
offer, depends strongly on the functioning of the housing market. This interconnection between
two frictional markets (housing and labor) is, per se, an interesting problem and deserves analysis.
This paper has offered such a model, based on decisions to accept or reject a job offer, given
the commuting distance to jobs. The model is relatively parsimonious, thanks to simplifying as-
sumptions such as the isotropy of space, an unrealistic assumption but which conveniently provides
closed form solutions and makes it possible to explain quit, job acceptance and geographic mo-
bility decisions with a decision rule on a single dimension. Our model is yet rich enough and
can be extended to deal with new issues such as discrimination in the housing market, mobility
allowances or “moving toward opportunity” schemes, spatial misatch issues and so on, as in the
urban economics literature.
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Figure 9: Housing Regulations and Unemployment
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We have attempted to explain differences in mobility rates between Europe and the US. A
calibration exercise of “Europe” and the US is able to account for differences in unemployment and
mobility thanks to a parameter which captures the speed of arrival of housing offers to households.
In our calibration, we find that housing frictions account for 0.6 percentage points of US unem-
ployment and at most 2 percentage points (out of 10) of European unemployment. However, policy
inducing mobility might never be able to reduce unemployment by 2 percentage points. Taking
the λH parameter to infinity is not an available option, given the nature of frictions. Tripling the
European value of λH to reach the US value is already an ambitious objective. Doing so reduces
unemployment in Europe by 0.6 percentage points, which is large already, but suggests that af-
ter all, housing market imperfections may not be a major cause of aggregate unemployment. Of
course, the lack of mobility is a more specific problem for outsiders in the labor market (young
workers in particular) and relatively low effects in aggregate could hide massive effects for some
categories of the population.
Finally, this conclusion of large effects of λH on mobility and positive but not massive effects on
unemployment is coherent with intra-European differences in housing market regulations. Based
on indices of rental housing market regulation, we find a strong negative correlation of the indices
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with geographical mobilty and a small and positive correlation with unemployment rates.
Future work should attempt to enrich the model to introduce more specific urban features such
as anisotropy of space and the existence of centers in cities and suburbs, as well as different groups
of the labor force. Our work is a first step in integrating housing and labor markets in a coherent
macroeconomic model.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of the determination of ρU
Rewrite the Bellman equations as:
rE(ρ) = w− τρ+ s(U−E(ρ))+λH
∫ ρE(ρ)
0
(E ′−E)dGN(ρ ′)
rU = b+ p
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
Take the value of E in ρU , we have:
rE(ρU) = w− τρU + s(U−E(ρU))+λH
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−E(ρU))dGN(ρ ′)
= rU = b+ p
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
so
ρU =
λH
τ
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dGN(ρ ′)− pτ
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)+ w−b
τ
(19)
This equation simplifies a bit after integrating by parts. Noting that
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dH(ρ ′) =
∫ ρU
0
τH(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)
dρ
where H is any distribution such that H(0) = 0, we can thus rewrite ρU as in the text.
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8.2 Link between F , FJ and GS
We start from the integrand A=
∫ ∫
max[U,E(ρ ′),E(ρ ′′)]dFJ(ρ ′)dGS(ρ ′′). Noting that
dE
dρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)
we can rewrite A as
A =
∫ ∫
{I[ρ ′ > ρU ]I[ρ ′′ > ρU ]U
+I[ρ ′ < ρ ′′]I[ρ ′ < ρU ]E(ρ ′)
+I[ρ ′′ < ρ ′]I[ρ ′′ < ρU ]E(ρ ′′)}
dFJ(ρ ′)dGS(ρ ′′)
or
A = U
∫
ρU
dFJ(ρ ′)
∫
ρU
dGS(ρ ′′)
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′)
(∫
ρ ′
dGS(ρ ′′)
)
dFJ(ρ ′)
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′′)
(∫
ρ ′′
dFJ(ρ ′)
)
dGS(ρ ′′)
or
A = U(1−FJ(ρU))(1−GS(ρU))
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′)
(
1−GS(ρ ′)
)
dFJ(ρ ′)
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′′)
(
1−FJ(ρ ′′)
)
dGS(ρ ′′)
Denote by F = 1− (1−FJ(ρ))(1−GS(ρ)). We have that
dF = (1−FJ)dGS+(1−GS)dFJ
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and we can thus rewrite
A = U(1−FJ(ρU))(1−GS(ρU))
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ)dF(ρ)
=
∫
max(U,E(ρ))dF(ρ)
The last equality comes from the observation that 1−F(ρU) = (1−FJ(ρU))(1−GS(ρU)).
8.3 Adding up moving costs
Let C be a relocation cost paid by workers. We ignore here GS assumed to be degenerate and fix
δ = 0. We have thus:
rE(ρ) = w− τρ+ s(U−E(ρ))+λH
∫
max
[
0,(E ′−E−C)]dGN(ρ ′)
rU = b+ p
∫
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
E is downward sloping in ρ with slope
dE
dρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHPW
where PW ≥ 0 is the probability to move conditional on receving a housing offer, with 0 < PW < 1
possibly depends on ρ . The function E(ρ) is thus monotonic and there is thus a well-defined
reservation strategy, with a reservation distance denoted by ρE for the employed above which a
housing offer is rejected. Note in addition that there is NOW state-dependence in the reservation
strategy of the employed: we have that ρE(ρ) with presumably dρE/dρ > 0: the further away the
tenants live from her job, the less likely they will reject an offer. (NB: to be shown in the general
case). e can rewrite
PW = GN(ρE(ρ))
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and obtain the Bellman equations as:
rE(ρ) = w− τρ+ s(U−E(ρ))+λH
∫ ρE(ρ)
0
(E ′−E−C)dGN(ρ ′)
rU = b+ p
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
31
